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On Bond Mutual Funds participation in the Lending Market 
Abstract 
The purpose of this master thesis is to examine which factors drive the decision of bond 
funds to lend their securities and the performance of those funds which lend relative to similar 
funds which do not. Overall, none of the variables studied impact the decision of funds to lend 
securities, and funds which lend perform similarly to non-lending funds. To further clarify the 
dependency of the return-lending attribute, funds were divided according to the permanent or 
non-permanent character of lending practices. Funds that alternate between lending and non-
lending exhibited a small albeit negligible return penalty.  
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The objective of this thesis is to ascertain the main differences between the bond 
mutual funds that operate in the bond lending market and the bond mutual funds which 
do not. In addition to that the thesis quantitatively determines if there are differences in 
how the two sets of bond mutual funds fare. 
1.2. Framework 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), in its 2019 annual report (FSOC, 
2019) estimated the value of securities lending transactions to be $2.4 trillion globally 
with the US carrying a 55% share of that market. Of the total global market, the FSOC 
estimates 43% can be accounted by equities and 45% by government securities, leaving 
corporate bonds and others an about 10% share of the market. These numbers agree with 
the International Securities Lending Association (ISLA) which reports (ISLA, 2019) the 
market at about €2.3 trillion ($2.5 trillion). Securities lending being comprised of 46% 
government bonds, 43% equities, and 10% corporate bonds. The International Security 
Lending Association (ISLA, 2019) report goes further, stating mutual and retail funds 
account for 46% of the supply and 18% of the demand for security lending; pension plans 
19% and 29%, respectively; and government central entities and sovereign banks 6% and 
14%.  
What is also indisputable, however, is that the securities lending market is globally 
significantly smaller than it was in the pre-financial crisis. Despite the global bond and 
equities markets in most situations having surpassed their pre-crisis levels, the market of 
securities lending amasses far smaller levels than in the past. A report (SEC, 2019) from 
the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) for the third quarter of 2009 shows that 
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the global value of security lending decreased from $4.8 trillion in 2007 to $2.5 trillion 
in late 2008, and as can be seen from the above reports the value of the market in 2008 is 
undoubtedly the closest to the current valuation. Furthermore, the market seems a lot more 
geographically concentrated, as the global market share of the US in 2007 was then a lot 
smaller at 12% in comparison to today’s 55% (SEC, 2019). 
One major reason for this decline in the size of the market seems in part to have been 
the increase in regulation surrounding security lending. In what regards bond lending, 
there were since the crisis many new regulatory measures introduced. Offering the EU as 
an example: there was an introduction of a compulsory central counterparty clearing for 
all bond lending trades across EU countries, thereby introducing a new intermediary; the 
introduction of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (recast) (Mifid II) requiring 
agency lenders to show regulators that they have executed each trade in the best possible 
manner on behalf of their clients; and the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation 
requiring borrowers and lenders to report each trade to a data repository by the end of the 
day as well as the reception of collateral by the following day, only this new regulation 
establishes 140 new different fields needing to be checked and answered to.  
Thus, from such direct new regulatory pressures on bond funds one can hypothesize 
that the market is not as able to take care of small lenders whose small economies entail 
many new regulations will carry a heavy cost. As such, bond funds from larger fund 
families will probably be more interested in entering the market.  
Since the design of the lending market seems highly beneficial to larger players, and 
economies of scale have been found in bond mutual funds, we should hypothesize that 
funds from larger fund families have a higher preponderancy to enter the lending market 
as they may see higher returns than ones from smaller families. 
6 
 
Nevertheless, bond mutual funds generally do not earn the same amount of revenue 
from lending bonds as equity mutual funds do from lending equities. The fact that the 
market largely exists is due to short selling, as naked short selling is not allowed in most 
exchanges, and since stocks are more volatile than bonds and bonds have a higher priority 
in case of a bankruptcy, there is generally a preference towards the shorting of equity as 
opposed to bonds.  
Stock lending, by design, does indeed carry conventionally higher valuations when 
compared to bond lending, however, the bond lending market is also important, bond 
funds do represent a large portion of the lending market and can there can even arise 
situations where bond lending is an only path to follow. For instance, there could be an 
investor wanting to long one tier of the capital structure and short another; a credit spread 
arbitrage; a market-wide interest rate arbitrage; an arbitrage between a firm’s bond and 
its CDS (or other securities reflecting credit quality); and borrowing a bond short-term to 
facilitate long trades whistle in the presence of temporary frictions in the delivery process. 
Lastly, there will be companies that have no publicly traded stocks but have bonds. 
Therefore, and with all factors considered and extensively stated, one can conclude 
that even though bond mutual funds seem to benefit from economies of scale they will 
probably not gather as much profit from bond lending as their equity counterparts. 
1.3. Organization of the document 
The document is organized as follows. In section 2 entitled “Literature review and 
hypothesis development” the literature that is relevant to the thesis is reviewed to understand 
the important hypotheses on the decisions taken by bond mutual funds to enter the bond lending 
market. Then in section 3 “Data”, we identify the quantitative data sources and detail the 
procedures used to manipulate the structure of the data so it was ready to be used in analysis. 
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In addition, this section also includes a statistical analysis of the data. In section 4 
“Methodology”, we present the methods used to retrieve the information needed for the 
multivariate regression analysis. Then section 5 deals with the multivariate regression analysis 
where the final results are presented and discussed. In section 6, motivated by the need to 
understand if non-linear coupling blurs the results of linear regression analysis, we evaluate the 
mutual information between the performance and lending attribute variables. Finally, in section 
7 we outline the main conclusions and outline some possible work that could follow. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Short selling and Efficiency 
In the previous sections we did not discuss if the lending market is efficiently priced or not. 
Given the short-selling constraints that exist, there is a strong case to be made that the market 
is priced inefficiently. 
One of the first studies looking at the efficiency of prices is (Miller, 1977). In this paper the 
author argued that when short selling is constrained more pessimistic investors refrain from 
participating, leading prices to follow an optimistic model. Harrison and Kreps (1978) go even 
further by providing a dynamic model where the price of a security is driven above the valuation 
of the most optimist investor. Other authors e.g. Diamond & Verecchia,  (1987) have argued 
differently, that short-selling constraints do not bias prices upward, but that they ultimately 
decrease the speed of adjustment and allow to achieve larger excess returns through the usage 
of public information. One may note an exception to this rule in Bai, Chang & Wang (2006) 
where the authors found that constraining short sales when they are driven by private 
information, can actually reduce the price of the asset as it increases the asset’s uncertainty and 
therefore decreases its demand. 
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Thus, it is an empirical question whether short sellers have abnormally high returns. 
Looking at the daily quantity of short selling Christophe, Ferri, and Angel  (2004) ; Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zang  (2008) ; Diether, Lee, and Werner Diether, K., Lee, (2009); Christophe, Ferri, 
and Hsieh (2010)  (2010) ; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang  (2020) or looking at medium term data 
on short interest Karpoff and Lou (2010) , all find that short sellers possess private information 
and their trades generate abnormally high returns. Looking at the price of borrowing stocks 
Jones and Lamont (2002) ; D’Avolio (2002); Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002); Ofek, 
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) find stocks with abnormally high rebate rates have future 
abnormally low returns. All in all, short sellers seem to be able to anticipate earnings surprises, 
financial misconduct, and analyst downgrades, confirming the hypothesis that the market 
presents prices that are too optimistic. 
The literature examining the market for short selling of bonds is much less abundant. 
Among the few ones, one can mention, Nashikkar and Pederson (2007); Asquith, Au, Covert, 
and Pathak (2007). Asquith et al findings agree with the notion that short sellers can anticipate 
a major credit event such as a bankruptcy, though not completely. They also find that bond 
lending costs are tied to equity lending costs and like Nashikkar and Pederson (2007) find that 
bonds which have worse credit ratings, higher yield spread, smaller issue size, less time to 
maturity, and are less liquid and expensive relative to the corresponding credit default swap 
generally carry a higher specialness.  
2.2. Interaction Between Bond Mutual Funds and the Short Selling 
Market 
Since the two markets of borrowing equity and borrowing stocks appear to be tied and 
related Asquith et al (2007) found that bond short sellers also appear able to forecast future 
events one could hypothesize, as Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2017) did for funds lending 
equities, that funds lending bonds may underperform similar funds in spite of lending income.  
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However, the literature on bond mutual fund performance is also sparse. In general, most 
literature agrees with the notion that bond mutual funds do not demonstrate superior 
performance net of expenses. Detzler (1999) using data spanning the years of 1988 to 1995 on 
a sample of funds gathered by Morningstar, found that returns seem to be even negatively 
correlated to fund expenses. In the paper from Chen, Ferson and Peters, (2010) the 
authors  corroborate this statement by finding that though bond mutual funds outperform the 
market before expenses, they underperform it after expenses. Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) 
even go to the conclusion that bond fund managers are generally totally ineffective at increasing 
risk-adjusted returns as one percentage point increase in expenses leads to a percentage point 
decrease in performance  
Thus, from such conclusions we could expect that the funds that enter the lending market 
would at most be in par with non-lending funds and not exhibit a better performance. In fact, 
entering the market carries higher expenses which, in spite of an expected better managerial 
expertise, seems to have a negative correlation with profits. Moreover, short sellers also seem 
to possess private information enabling them to achieve abnormal returns. Similarly to the 
already referred paper of Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2017) where the authors started with and 
verified the  hypothesis of the short-sellers abnormally high returns, found that equity funds 
that entered the lending market exhibited an abnormally negative performance. However, other 
papers disagree, namely when it comes to bond fund performance. In the paper by Asquith et 
al (2007) we read that  there is nothing abnormal in fund performance, as the authors find that 
the bond short sellers considered did not have abnormally strong performance, exhibiting 
negative returns which were almost the opposite of the market. The authors hypothesized the 
negative return to be consistent with short selling as a hedging activity with the short sellers 
paying the hedge. In another paper by Philpot, Hearth, Rimbey, & Schulman (2005) the authors 
concluded that, despite enjoying economies of scale, the past performance of a bond mutual 
10 
 
fund,  unlike what happens with equity mutual funds, is not a good indicator for predicting the 
future fund performance. Therefore, from the last paper one could also reasonably hypothesize 
the performance after being in the lending market to be no different to the performance from 
before. 
If this is so, this can disprove that bond funds which lend should underperform otherwise 
similar funds. Thus, it needs to be tested whether in the bond lending market such 
underperformance exists or not. However, outperformance among lenders is almost out of 
question, unless that outperformance is brought by another correlating factor such as the size of 
the fund. 
Also of considerable importance is the explanation found by Evans, Ferreira, and Prado 
(2017) to justify why funds continue to lend securities despite knowing that short sellers possess 
private information and security lenders underperform non-security lenders. What the paper 
found was that funds that do security lending are on average more constrained compared to 
funds that do not lend securities. Imparting from a quote of Kevin Parke CEO of Massachusetts 
Financial Services, quoted in the referred paper, it appears to be true for some funds that their 
managers should stick to stocks even if they are out of favor and do not sell them to build a 
different portfolio. This may lead managers to get additional income through the lending of 
securities as they expect that for some time their portfolio will underperform.  
Indeed, there are other papers that can give credibility  to the statement that the presence of 
investment constraints is prejudicial for fund performance. Argawal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) 
find that mutual funds which implement hedge fund strategies outperform traditional mutual 
funds. Closer to our subject matter, Fabio Moneta (2015) finds that bond mutual funds which 
have a higher turnover rate have abnormally high returns. 
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Moreover, since high turnover bond mutual funds with lesser investment constraints seem 
to have higher returns it is important to add that another relevant factor for the entry into the 
lending market is turnover. High turnover funds generally restrain from entering the lending 
market as they may anticipate a greater number of loan recalls. Indeed, short sellers also prefer 
more passive funds like index funds; this arises not only from the risk of a recall, but also the 
fact that the median time taken to reestablish a short with a lender is nine trading days 
(D’Avolio, 2002).  
In fact, in the US there is also a settlement lag of about three days on share lending contracts, 
meaning bonds must be delivered within three days after a sell. One can either locate the buyer 
first and then sell short or sell short and locate a buyer three days after a sell. Nevertheless, even 
if the settlement was successful it may have taken three business days to complete and in most 
countries the lags are even worse. 
Therefore, we should divide bond mutual funds into passive and active bond mutual funds 
to see if indeed funds which more closely follow indexes are more likely to lend bonds as 
opposed to those which are actively managed. However, from already mentioned Fabio Moneta 
(2015) turnover or, in this case, a fund’s lending status could also be correlated to the study 
variable performance. This is something we need to be careful as it may outweigh the value of 
the study variable. 
A final matter of interest is pricing impact. As discussed by Rizova (2011) and Rowley et 
al  (2016) a fund may not want to lend because doing so may create market disinterest. This is 
because the market may perceive the fund’s lending as a bearish signal indicating that the 
security, or in this case, bond, will not have satisfactorily enough returns for the fund managers 
in the future. Thus, it is important to see if the funds that have a higher rate of ownership for 
the securities they invest in do refrain from lending.  
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In agreement with this view Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2016) find that stocks with more 
concentrated fund ownership have greater borrowing costs, higher recall risk, and increased 
levels of arbitrage risk. More particularly, the paper found both the concentration of fund 
ownership and the type of ownership, if active or passive, seem to provide relevant information 
on short-selling supply. 
To test for the impact of pricing in the entry of funds we could follow Rizova (2011), and 
have a variable which interacts a fund’s investment ratio in bonds of companies with small and 
medium capitalization with the total amount of assets a fund has. The comparatively higher the 
fund scores in that variable the more concentrated its bond ownership should be. However, the 
best decision, while also regarding the data available, seems to be to simply test if the 
performance of a bond mutual fund after entry in the bond lending market is lower. 
If the performance does not decline meaningfully, one can conclude that the effect of the 
pricing impact is irrelevant. If however the performance of bond mutual funds decreases 
significantly then pricing impact cannot be discarded. 
2.3. Additional Aspects: Economies of Scale 
As mentioned in the introduction there is a strong case to be made for the presence of 
economies of scale. One important point unmentioned is the common use of a custodian 
involved to facilitate this transaction. The owner of the bonds would lend them to a 
custodian who would then find a willing short seller. The custodian will generally split 
the fees 25% to himself and 75% to the owner of the bond, but these numbers can change 
a lot depending on the conditions. These fees are generally heftier for smaller parties than 
they are for larger. Indeed, Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen, (2002) and (2005) have argued 
that less connected borrowers often find themselves unable to arrange transactions to 
execute their trades, and in Rizova’s Securities Lending by Mutual Funds (2011) splits 
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vary immensely, from 14% to the custodian and 86% to the lender to 50% for the 
custodian and 50% for the lender. 
This issue can be explained by search frictions. This term was presented by Duffie et 
al. (2002) who constructed a dynamic model in which the frequency at which lenders and 
sellers were able to find one another was limited, to this opacity they gave the term search 
frictions. Only later did Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg  (2013) find that search 
frictions significantly impact short-selling costs. An implicit conclusion that can also 
follow is that of Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) who report lending agents prefer to work 
with larger security lenders. 
However, because of the manner that search frictions operate, funds that have been in 
the market for a longer time may also be more knowledgeable and thus better able to 
acquire deals with custodians or if not through the use of a custodians they will probably 
be more noticeable in the market. 
And pertaining solely to bond mutual funds, in a paper from Philpot, Hearth, Rimbey, 
and Schulman (2005) the authors have found that bond mutual funds unlike equity mutual 
funds enjoy economies of scale in their returns. Thus, if there are size advantages in the 
lending market such advantages should be even more perceptible in the results of bond 
mutual funds. 
2.4. Final Remarks 
Concluding this chapter in hypotheses development one can now explicitly write the 
different hypotheses to test for: 
1. Does size affect the participation of a fund in the lending market; 
2. Does being a passive or an active fund affect participation in that same market; 
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3. Are either the variance or annualized returns variables of interest in explaining fund 
participation in the lending market; 
4. What is the exact impact on returns from being in the lending market; 
5. Accounting for size, investment objective, and riskiness of returns, is the difference 
of returns from participating in the lending market now substantial? 
3. Data 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), regulated funds including mutual 
funds and closed ended funds, and 1940 Act exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are required to 
disclose in their annual reports information pertaining to their lending activity. 
Data was retrieved from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), more succinctly, the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database on mutual funds. The mutual funds 
from which data was retrieved were mutual funds which had their identification, in this case 
the CRSP fund number, reported in a document with data from NSAR filings which contained 
the proprietary information on whether those funds lent or not. 
In line with the hypotheses discussed above the variables considered were Total Net Assets 
as of Month End, which by giving the total net asset value of the fund it is important in retrieving 
information for a study on the gains from scale of bond mutual funds. Another variable retrieved 
was Total Return per Share as of Month End which gives information on the performance of 
the fund, making it interesting for discerning not only if there is pricing impact on a fund but 
also how important past performance is for a fund entry. Also retrieved was the variable 
Index_fund_flag, which differentiating if a fund operates as an index fund or as an active fund. 
Lastly, a binary variable taking into consideration the Lipper Classification Code of a fund, that 
is, the investment objective of a fund, was produced. For funds which seem to follow a low risk 
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strategy the variable was given the value of 0, for funds which do not the variable was assigned 
a value of 1.  
Since the dates shown on CRSP are not the same dates as the ones shown on the document 
with proprietary data, an extensive process to retrieve a common date for analysis was 
undertaken. First for each fund the difference between CRSP’s date and the closest date shown 
on the NSAR filing was calculated. The dates on the document tell us if from 6 months prior to 
the date to the date shown the fund was either lending or not lending, thus when retrieving the 
closest date from CRSP to NSAR’s date it is not a problem if the CRSP date is an earlier date, 
as long as the difference is less or equal to 6 months. As such, the procedure was first to check 
if the difference between the closest date on the CRSP and on the NSAR filing was higher than 
3 months, if the difference is not higher than 3 months then dates will be matched at the date 
on the NSAR filings. If the difference is higher than 3 months we check if an earlier date to that 
on the NSAR filing exists that is no more than 6 months apart. If there is no such date, then the 
data is discarded.  
After the data has been prepared the hypotheses can finally be quantitatively analyzed. 
Firstly, one starts by constructing tables with the participation rate of mutual funds in the 
lending market to see how the rate of participation changed within those years. As stated, from 
2006 through 2016, the years through which we have data, participation rates should not 
substantially increase.  
Also, likewise Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2017) participation rates should be analyzed 
between active and index funds to see if a substantial difference in participation rate appears 
between either group, as stated in one of the hypotheses. 
The first retrieved result was a table  with a year by year (Table I) descriptive data on the 
evolution of funds that lend and funds that do not lend. As can be seen from 2008 to 2016, the 
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years where the amount of total funds is significant enough to be analyzed, the percentage of 
funds that do not lend significantly increased from about 48.40% to 71.63%. This was in line 
with expectations as regulations following the 2008/2009 economic recession made it harder 
for funds to lend bonds. All in all, in the greater part of the research there are between 312 and 
712 bond funds for which data can be retrieved on the lending of bonds, which is satisfactory 
as total the dataset carries 791 bond mutual funds.  



















do not Lend 
2005 88 28 60 31.82% 68.18% 
2006 312 161 151 51.60% 48.40% 
2007 398 229 169 57.54% 42.46% 
2008 564 294 270 52.13% 47.87% 
2009 612 282 330 46.08% 53.92% 
2010 629 241 388 38.31% 61.69% 
2011 665 254 411 38.20% 61.80% 
2012 691 234 457 33.86% 66.14% 
2013 700 259 441 37.00% 63.00% 
2014 699 234 465 33.48% 66.52% 
2015 716 212 504 29.61% 70.39% 
2016 712 202 510 28.37% 71.63% 
 
It is also relevant to analyze fund lending by the type of fund, if active or passive as shown 
in Table II. Active funds that lend decreased significantly from 50.34% of those funds in 
2006 to 27.69% in 2016. This decline was in line with the average fund, which should be 
expected since active funds are about 95% of total funds. Passive funds which lend also 
decreased very significantly from 92.86% to 42.42%. Overall, as expected, passive funds 
seem to be keener in participating in the bond lending market, however, since the number of 
passive funds is so low when compared to the number of active funds only regression 
analysis will be able to show if this is a significant result or not. 
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2005 80 26.25% 73.75% 8 87.50% 12.50% 
2006 298 49.66% 50.34% 14 92.86% 7.14% 
2007 377 56.23% 43.77% 21 80.95% 19.05% 
2008 540 50.93% 49.07% 24 79.17% 20.83% 
2009 583 44.94% 55.06% 29 68.97% 31.03% 
2010 601 37.10% 62.90% 28 64.29% 35.71% 
2011 636 36.64% 63.36% 29 72.41% 27.59% 
2012 662 34.59% 65.41% 29 17.24% 82.76% 
2013 667 36.88% 63.12% 33 39.39% 60.61% 
2014 666 33.03% 66.97% 33 42.42% 57.58% 
2015 684 29.09% 70.91% 32 40.63% 59.38% 
2016 679 27.69% 72.31% 33 42.42% 57.58% 
 
Being the size of the fund, the variance of a fund’s returns, the fund objective, and the 
passivity or activeness of a bond fund the variables of interest, it was also important to retrieve 
data on those variables in order to see if a fund which lends is substantially different from a 
fund which does not lend.  
First, when calculating relevant data on the variables of interest it is important to know how 
many samples are in the dataset. As is shown in the columns  of Table III there are 22 371 
samples with 37.86% of them representing funds that lend and the rest funds that do not lend, 
very similar to the first table. 
Table III Number of samples and lending characteristics 
Number of Samples 22371 
Number of Samples without 
Lending 13899 
Number of Samples with 
Lending 8472 
Probability of Lending 37.87% 




From this dataset data was retrieved the logarithm of the net asset value (NAV) of funds. 
As can be seen in Table IV the average value of the logarithm of the net asset value is .981. 
There is also little difference between the value for the funds that lend (.972) and those that do 
not lend (.986). The variance however is lower in funds that lend and to funds that do not lend 
(.05). Using the standard deviation metric in order to calculate a 95% confidence interval, one 
can also recognize that both the expected log of Net Asset Value  (NAV) for lenders (.5025 to 
1.42) and non-lenders (.629 to 1.342) may be equal. One can even discard the hypothesis of a 
difference between the log of funds which lend and those that do not as the 95% confidence 
interval of funds that lend is entirely contained on the interval for funds which do not lend. 
Table IV Statistics of Log Net Asset Value variable 
Expected Log Net Asset 
Value 
Expected Log of 
NAV for those which 
lend 
Expected Log of NAV 
for those which do not 
lend 
0.981 0.972 0.986 
Variance of Log of Net 
Asset Value 
Variance Log (NAV) 
knowing that it lends 
VAR of Log (NAV) 
knowing it doesn't lend 
0.039 0.050 0.032 
Standard dev. of Log of 
NAV 
Standard dev. of log 
(NAV) knowing it lends 
Standard dev. of Log 
of NAV knowing doesn't 
lend 
0.197 0.224 0.178 
Expected Log NAV 
95% Confidence Interval 
Expected Log of 
NAV 95% Confidence 
Interval for lenders 
Expected Log NAV 
95% confidence interval 
for non lenders 
.587 to 1.374 .5025 to 1.42 .629 to 1.342 
 
From the second dataset, transcribed below, one can observe information for the quarterly 
performance of mutual funds (Table V). The average and expected performance for the funds 
in the dataset is of .014, and it is the same for funds that lend (.014) compared to funds that do 
not lend (.014). The variance of returns is also very low at an average value of .002, being equal 
to .001 for funds which lend and .002 for funds which do not lend. There is also a good chance 
the both the funds which lend and those which do not lend will have the exact same quarterly 
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return, with the confidence interval of the quarterly return for the first group ranging from -.066 
to .088 and of the second group going from -.070 to .088. In fact, the confidence interval of the 
quarterly returns of funds which lend is entirely contained in the confidence interval of the 
funds which do not lend. 




Expected Q Performance 
for those which lend 
Expected Q Performance for 
those which do not lend 
0.014 0.014 0.014 
Variance of 
Performance 
Variance of Performance 
knowing it lends 
Variance of Performance 
knowing it does not lend 
0.002 0.001 0.002 
Standard dev. of 
Q Perf 
Standard dev. of Q Perf 
knowing it lends 
Standard dev. of Q Perf 
knowing it does not lend 
0.039 0.038 0.040 
95% 
Confidence Interval 
for Q Performance 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Q Performance knowing 
it lends 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Q Performance knowing it does 
not lend 
-0.065 to .092 -.063 to .090 -.066 to .093 
 
For the binary variable (Table VI) characterizing if a fund engages in low risk investment 
strategy or not, with the value 1 being given for funds which do not engage in low risk 
investment and 0 being given for funds which do, the average binary value, shown below, is 
around .973 which means the vast majority of funds are, according to the criteria chosen, funds 
which do not engage in a low risk investment profile. Again, there is not a significant difference 
between those funds which lend (.970) and those funds which do not lend (.977). The variances 
are also similar, .029 and .022, thus the confidence interval will also be similar, .672 to 1.269 
and .638 to 1.316. There does not seem to be any significance between the investment profile 
of any given fund and it choosing to lend bonds.  
As stated, in order to calculate the value of one or zero of the binary variables characterizing 
the risk from the investment strategy of a given fund, the Lipper objective variable from WRDS 
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was used. The Lipper objective variable describes a fund’s investment style. It has about 29 
different qualitative values, but only short term US government funds (SUS), short to 
intermediate term US government funds (SIU), general US government funds (GUS), 
intermediate term US government funds (IUG), money market funds (MM) were considered to 
be low risk funds. This means that only 5 of the 29 different types of fund’s were engaging in 
low-risk investment and were given a binary value of 0. This explains why the high value close 
to 1 that this binary variable has.  
Table VI Statistics for the Risk variable 
Expected Binary 
value 
Expected Binary value 
for those which lend 
Expected Binary value for 
those which don't lend 
0.973 0.970 0.977 
Variance of 
Binary 
Variance of Binary 
knowing that it doesn't lend 
Variance of Binary 
knowing that it lends 
0.026 0.029 0.022 
Standard deviation 
of binary 
Standard deviation of 
binary knowing it lends 
Standard deviation of 
binary knowing it doesn't lend 
0.162 0.149 0.169 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Expected 
Binary Value 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Expected 
Binary Value for lenders 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Expected Binary Value for 
non lenders 
.649 to 1.291 .672 to 1.269 .638 o 1.316 
 
Then comes the binary variable characterizing a fund follows an active or a passive strategy, 
with the value 1 being given for fund follows an active strategy and 0 if the fund follows a 
passive strategy, the average binary value is around .962 which means the vast majority of funds 
are active. Again, there is not a significant difference between those funds which lend (.974) 
and those funds which do not lend (.942). The variances are however different, .026 and .055, 
producing a confidence interval between .506 to 1.442 for funds which lend and of .622 to 1.262 
for funds which do not engage in lending. Overall we can state that the fact that a fund lends or 
does not lend probably has no significant correlation with the fund being a passive or an active 
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fund, as the confidence interval of non-lender funds is entirely contained on the confidence 
interval of funds that lend. 
Table VII Statistics for Active / Passive variable 
Expected Binary 
value 
Expected Binary value 
for those which lend 
Expected Binary value for 
those which do not lend 
0.962 0.974 0.942 
Variance of Binary Variance of Binary 
knowing that it doesn't lend 
Variance of Binary 
knowing that it lends 
0.037 0.026 0.055 
Standard deviation 
of binary 
Standard deviation of 
binary knowing it lends 
Standard deviation of 
binary knowing it does not lend 
0.192 0.234 0.160 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Expected 
Binary Value 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Expected Binary Value 
for lenders 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Expected Binary Value for 
non-lenders 
.578 to 1.338 .506 to 1.442 .622 o 1.262 
 
When adding the variable variance of returns the number of samples decreases substantially 
to 9616, as shown in the table below. This is because there is the need to have both the last 
three variables and VAR coinciding in time which does not occur often. The percentage of 
funds which do not lend is now 60.80% and those that lend is 39.20%, thus not comparatively 
too different.  
Table VIII Distribution of Funds When Adding Variance Variable 
Number of Samples 9616 
Number of Samples with Lending 3769 
Number of Samples Without Lending 5847 
Probability of not Lending 60.8% 
Probability of Lending 39.2% 
 
The variable VAR (Table IX) and its variance carry such low values that its variance is zero 
when approximating to the third decimal digit, both for funds that lend and funds that do not 
lend bonds. Nevertheless, when looking at the 95% confidence intervals, the first funds have 
a confidence interval ranging between -.016 to .024 and those which do not lend between     
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-.021 to .029. Therefore, it is not certain that with an alpha of .10 the variance of returns will 
be a significant variable to explain the lending decision of a fund. 
Table IX Statistics for the Variance variable 
Expected 
Variance 
Expected Variance for 
those which lend 
Expected Variance for those 
which do not lend 
0.004 0.004 0.004 
Variance of 
VAR 
Variance of VAR 
knowing it lends 
Variance of VAR knowing it 
does not lend 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard dev. 
of VAR 
Standard dev. of VAR 
knowing it lends 
Standard dev. of VAR 
knowing it does not lend 





Interval for VAR knowing 
it lends 
95% Confidence Interval for 
VAR knowing it does not lend 
 
4. Methodology 
Following Rizova (2011) approach regressions can be drawn to see if being in the lending 
market affects the returns of a fund. Thus, a first regression would have as an independent 
variable the return of the fund and as dependent the lending status of that given fund. 
Nevertheless, there are other variables that can affect the return of a fund other than the lending 
status of a fund, so we keep adding variables that seem pertinent, such as the size of the fund, 
the investment objective of that fund, and the riskiness of returns. 
Since have we described the main variables of interest, we can now conclude that the control 
variables, namely, the logarithm of net asset value, the active or passive binary variable, the 
fund’s objective strategy, and the value at risk are not correlated to the main explanatory binary 
variable of a fund’s lending. However, they can still be informative in explaining differences in 
our dependent variable, the fund’s quarterly performance. Thus, regressions were drawn 
attending to that. 
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5. Multivariate Regression Analysis  
The first regression takes the lending status of a fund as a sole variable to explain the fund’s 
quarterly performance. The second regression adds to it the logarithm of the net asset value. A 
third regression adds a binary on the fund’s active or passive status. Lastly, a fourth regression, 
albeit with less samples, adds the VAR of returns.  
It can be inferred from the results of the first regression, as shown in the table below (Table 
X), that there is no significant relationship between quarterly return, the response variable, and 
lending status, the explanatory variable. The coefficient estimating the relationship between 
both variables is very close to zero and a t-value of -0.0042 is in this case insignificant. 
Table X First Regression 
Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return 
              
              
     -6.83E-06     
        (0.0016284)     
              
 




-4.47E-05           
              
SE Clustered by  
Year and Fund Yes           
 
In the second regression neither lending status nor the log of net asset value appear to be 
significant variables. Lending status carries a t-value of -.1602 and the log of net asset value a 
t-value of -1.35, both very insignificant, with p-values of .87 and .17 respectively. The second 
regression also carries an adjusted 𝑅2 very close to zero with the added variables not able to 
explain almost anything of the variation in returns. 
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Table XI Second Regression 
Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return 
              
              
    
 
-2.67E-04     
        (1.66E-03)     
    
 
-0.0165358     
        (0.01227741)     
              




6.57E-03           
              
SE Clustered by  
Year and Fund Yes           
            
 
In the third regression shown herein, which adds the variable active or passive, also no 
significant variables were found. The most significant variable is again the log of net asset with 
a p-value of -.17 and the adjusted 𝑅2 did not change compared to the previous regression. 
Table XII Third Regression 
Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return 
              
              
    
 
-2.49E-04     
        (1.67E-03)     
    
 
-0.01647     
        (0.012068)     
     0.000508     
        (0.002758)     
              




6.53E-03           
              
SE Clustered by  




Adding a fourth binary variable, risk, created from the Lipper fund objective also does 
not add relevant information, with the adjusted 𝑅2 even decreasing compared to the one in 
the previous regression. 
Table XIII Fourth Regression 
Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return  
          
          
     -2.77E-04     
        (1.67E-03)     
     -0.01624     
        (0.011924)     
     0.00036     
        (0.002691)     
       0.003915     
        (0.002784)     
          




9.15E-03       
          
SE Clustered by  
Year and Fund Yes       
 
Adding the variance of returns, as expected, significantly increases the adjusted 𝑅2 to .252. 
The variance of returns is generally highly correlated to total returns, the three asterisks in 
the table actually mean that the variable is significant to an alpha of less than 1%. 
However, by adding the variable VAR the total number of observations decreases from 







Table XIV Fifth Regression 
Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return 
              
              
    
 
-6.43E-04     
        (2.36E-03)     
    
 
-0.0017     
        (0.009261)     
    
 
-0.00068     
        (0.002601)     
    
 
  0.003664     
        (0.002122)     
    
 
  1.868511***     
        (0.642605)     
              
N     9616           




0.2524           
              
SE Clustered by 
Year and Fund  Yes           
 
One could state that the variable risk was an attempt to measure the impact of return 
variance without forfeiting on the amount of data lost by VAR. However, since we are 
using the variable VAR already in the regressions, we can remove the variable risk. This 
sixth regression, however, still shows no major significant variables other than VAR; and 









Dependent Variable: Bond Mutual Fund Quarterly Return 
              
              
    
 
-6.20E-04     
        (2.36E-03)     
    
 
-0.00188     
        (0.009274)     
    
 
-0.00027     
        (0.002601)     
    
 
  1.869238***     
        (0.642283)     
              




0.2524           
              
               SE Clustered by  
               Year and Fund Yes           
            
. 
6. Information Theory Based Checks 
6.1. Quaterly return statistics conditioned to lending 
Motivated by the absence of evidence about the influence the lending variable on the fund 
return, I looked at the possibility of still having information between the lending and return but 
in a non linear way that would not be recognized by the linear regressions or correlation metrics 
that focus om linear dependencies. To test that we considered the metric of mutual information 
between random variables from the Information theory (IT) field. 
Although a presentation of the basic concepts of IT is not the purpose of this document we 
present the basic metrics in Appendix 2, while additional details and solid treatment can found 
in several textbooks (e.g. (Cover & Thomas, 1991)), it is worthy to point out some comments. 
With two random variable X and Y the covariance cov(X,Y), performs a weighted sum between 
samples of X and Y, that will be maximum (in modulus) when they are perfectly aligned and 
thus the aim is to confirm or infirm linear dependencies. The mutual information metric I(X,Y) 
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looks at what non-independence does to their joint probability distribution (which can be 
estimated). That is, I(X,Y) is the average value of the logarithmic measure of distance from 
independence. We may say that Mutual Information "is not concerned" whether the association 
between two variables is linear or not, while Covariance may be zero while the variables may 
still be dependent. On the other hand, the covariance can be calculated directly from a data 
sample without the need to actually know the probability distributions while for the mutual 
information either we know the distributions or have to apriori estimates by constructing 
histograms from the samples. 
We used such concepts to understand how much related are the variables lending and 
quarterly return to check if the findings from statistical regression techniques are confirmed by 
IT. For a total of 9616 samples we computed: the main statistics  for the variables; the quarterly 
returns histograms unconditioned and conditioned; The IT metrics (entropy and mutual 
information). For the IT metrics the probability functions for quarterly return (QR) were 
estimated using an histogram with 138 intervals (the value of 138 comes from the program sed 
that optimizes the number of intervals to smooth the estimates). The results are shown in Table 
XV.  
Concerning the conditional averages and standard deviation (std), the values are quite 
similar either there is lending (variable equal to1) or not(variable equal to 0). The standard 
deviation turns to be quite high as we have significant tails in terms of return. 
Concerning the IT metrics, the mutual information between the lending and quarterly 
returns is only 0.04bits for a total entropy of 4.45 bits in the quarterly returns. That is, with such 
a small mutual information it is clear that there is no significant non-linear dependency between 
these variables and therefore looking for regressions involving non-linear combinations of 




Table XV IT metrics and statistics conditioned to lending 
 
6.2. Lending usage-based division of the samples  
The regression analysis provided no evidence of dependence between the quarterly 
return and lending attribute of the fund. This finding was also confirmed through the 
computation of the mutual information between the variables. 
Motivated by such issues we divided the funds in three classes to perform a further 
analysis. The mutual funds were in three different groups. The first group (class 0) 
includes the funds which participated for all samples in the lending market, the second 
group (class1) includes those which never participate, and a third group (class2) 
includes the funds which participated at some times and did not for other samples. The 
data is shown in Table XVI: 
Table XVI Distribution of funds per class 
 
Statistic Value
Average QR conditioned to lending=1 1,56%
Std QR conditioned to lending=1 4,08%
Average QR conditioned to lending=1 1,56%
Std QR conditioned to lending=0 4,46%
Entropy of lending variable 0,97 bits
Entropy of qr variable 4,45 bits
Entropy of joint distribution 5,37bits
Mutual Information 0,04 bits







We then retrieved the data on returns and standard deviation of those returns for these 
classes of funds, as is transcribed in the following table. As can be noted there is almost no 
difference between the average returns of the funds which always lend and those which never 
lend, neither between the standard deviations of the two groups of funds. The maximum and 
the minimum values found in the dataset were also relatively similar for both lenders and non-
lenders. There was however a non-negligible difference in the average quarterly return of the 
mixed group of funds compared to the first two. While non-negligible this difference was 
nevertheless quite small when compared to the standard deviation. Using this classification of 
three categories the mutual information increases to 0.08 bits, which is still low but has 
increase relatively to the one obtained with only two classes. The results, that must be taken 
with caution, point out that funds that alternate between lending and non-lending suffer some 
penalty in terms of return through the alternate behavior.  




The initial objective of the thesis was to check the impact and existence of clear relations 
between the lending activity and the performance / characteristics of mutual bond funds. An 
analysis was carried out using the statistical tools for regression. The main conclusion from 
this thesis is that there is no evidence of a difference between the fund characteristics of funds 
that have not entered in the securities lending market and those which did enter the market, at 
least as it relates to the size, performance, investment style of those funds, and variance of 
Average Q.
Return
0 1.72% 4.04% 26.39% -29.22%
1 1.79% 4.29% 34.47% -23.73




Max Value Min Value
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returns. Bond mutual fund returns do not seem to be significantly affected by the size of a 
fund, by the investment style of a fund, and by the risk of a fund, as the regressions do not 
indicate any evident relation with the lending strategy. Motivated by this result, some work 
was performed using concepts from IT to check if there was some non-linear dependence that 
could not be caught by a linear analysis. Considering the IT metric of mutual information, we 
obtained a residual value which indicates that the low values obtained with regressions are not 
due to the lack of non-linear combinations of variables. To further clarify the dependency 
return-lending attribute, we divided the funds in three classes according to the permanent or 
non-permanent character of the lending decisions, and found that funds that alternate between 
lending and non-lending exhibit some return small but non-negligible penalty. These results 





8. Appendix- Metrics in Information Theory 
In Information theory the main concepts that emerge are: 
1. Entropy: this represents the amount of intrinsic Information existing in a 
random variable i.e. the number of bits necessary to represent the outcomes 




𝐻(𝑋, 𝑌)=−∑ 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)log⁡(𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑥,𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎⁡𝑏𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡(𝑋, 𝑌) 
2. Conditional entropy: represents the amount of uncertainty remaining in one 
variable Y after we know X 
𝐻(𝑌|𝑋)=−∑ 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)log⁡(𝑝(𝑦|𝑥)𝑥,𝑦  
3. Mutual Information: represents the information that is common to two 
variables X and Y. 




In most cases the log is in base 2 and the units are in bits. 
The mutual Information can be related to the bivariate and conditional entropies 
𝐼(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑌) − 𝐻(𝑌|𝑋)=𝐻(𝑋) − 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) 
This can be illustrated graphically as shown in Figure 1.When I(X,Y)=0, there is no 




Figure 1 Relation between the different measures of information 
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